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istory provides many examples of self-governing communities that main-
tained extensive economic exchange and order despite the absence of a
government that enforced the law or protected property rights. In
such cases, individuals engaging in economic activity with different groups or with
others in a single group must develop self-enforcing mechanisms that will induce
cooperation, such as abiding by contracts. Individuals facilitate cooperation by
various means, including reputation, signaling, and commitment mechanisms, which
allow self-enforcing exchange in a diversity of situations. For example, Edward
Stringham (2003) identifies the self-enforcing mechanisms that facilitated the rise
of seventeenth-century stock exchanges in Amsterdam. Exchange occurred among
medieval traders with the assistance of institutions such as the law merchant (Greif
1989; Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). Peter Leeson (2007b, 2008) identifies
the signaling and commitment mechanisms that facilitated exchange in precolonial
African trade. Emily Schaeffer (2008) examines a modern-day manifestation of these
types of self-enforcing reputation mechanisms in the case of Hawala traders, who act
as intermediaries in international financial transactions. For a contemporary stateless
society, Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh (2008) find that Somalia’s
relative economic performance has improved during its period of statelessness. (See
Stringham 2007 for an excellent collection of related essays on anarchy and the law.)
These studies demonstrate the remarkable variety of situations in which people
benefit from mutually beneficial exchange and establish order without the assistance
of the state.
David B. Skarbek is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at George Mason University.
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In these studies, no particular bias exists that causes the people involved to be
relatively uncooperative, so it is unclear how robust the outcomes are compared to
those for less-cooperative individuals.1 To understand better the role of the agents’
type in self-enforcing exchanges, I examine here how inmates of the San Pedro
Prison in La Paz, Bolivia, where inmates must govern themselves, overcome particu-
larly serious impediments to the establishment of order. Cooperation among prison
inmates is especially unlikely because criminals have high discount rates, lack the
ability to exclude noncooperators from their community, and cannot migrate away
from predatory groups. Nonetheless, San Pedro Prison has not deteriorated into a
predatory environment in which a single group abuses others. On the contrary,
inmates have secure, long-term property rights in their housing and other valuable
resources and engage in extensive economic exchange; and outsiders voluntarily
associate with and even live among the prisoners.
Past research on self-governance in a prison environment examined the Ander-
sonville prison camp that operated in Georgia during the War Between the States and
concluded that such an institutional setting was likely to produce a dominant
predatory group (Hogarty [1972] 2006). Opening in 1864, Andersonville quickly
filled with captured Union soldiers. The prison received more than forty thousand
inmates, 40 percent of whom died (Costa and Kahn 2007). The survivors suffered at
starvation levels of subsistence and were plagued by sickness and disease, and
many endured physical abuse by other inmates. Bands of “Raiders” brutalized,
pilfered, and abused newly arriving prisoners. Thomas Hogarty ([1972] 2006) cites
MacKinlay Kantor’s (1955) depiction of the Raiders’ robbery of these “fresh fish.”2
The leader of the Raiders, John Sarsfield,
shouldered forward and wrenched the [blanket] roll away from the nearest
prisoner. The man hallooed, Sarsfield knocked him flat, the balance of the
fresh fish leaped toward Sarsfield, Sarsfield’s Raiders swatted, stabbed,
kicked. This fight was over in less than a minute. Six of the [new prisoners]
lay on the ground and the rest had fallen back into the watching throng—
several others shy of their blanket rolls, as was the first man. All of the new-
come prisoners were bleeding, two were unconscious. Sarsfield’s Raiders
were the richer by eleven blanket rolls filled with combs, socks, extra shoes,
Bibles (these could be bartered), gilt melaineotypes, housewives, knives,
eating utensils, and name-it-if-you-like. (Hogarty [1972] 2006, 107)
1. Other studies have examined self-governance among biased agent types; for example, Leeson 2007a
examines order among eighteen-century pirates, and Skarbek forthcoming investigates self-governance in
a California prison gang.
2. Hogarty’s article, originally a part of Gordon Tullock’s (1972) collection Explorations in the Theory of
Anarchy, is reprinted in Edward Stringham’s thought-provoking 2006 collection of essays on public
choice and anarchy. The latter book includes essays by members of the Virginia School of Public Choice,
such as James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, who criticize anarchy. The volume then presents essays
defending anarchy, including work by Scott Beaulier, Christopher Coyne, Peter Leeson, Benjamin Powell,
and Virgil Storr (all listed in the references).
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Only after another group of prisoners, known as the Regulators, grouped together
with the assistance of the prison guards were the Raiders overthrown and order
restored.
Hogarty argues that the events at Andersonville show that situations of self-
governance will necessarily be chaotic. In particular, he finds evidence confirming the
hypothesis that self-governing communities will give rise to domination by a group of
people—the most “criminal” ones—over other, productive members of the community,
and the dominators will attack the others to benefit themselves. The dominant group
will consist of the most criminal individuals because, according to Hogarty, they will
“‘feel more at home’ than they did in the society of rules” ([1972] 2006, 108, 100).3
In general, prisons differ from a situation approximating anarchy in several
important ways that make order more difficult to achieve. First, as Virgil Storr notes,
prisoners have few opportunities for productive enterprise (2006, 120).4 Some trad-
ing occurred in Andersonville, but the extent of the market was greatly restricted.
With few options for productive enterprise, it is more likely that people will come
into conflict, biasing prisons toward more violence and less order. Second, prisoners
have few resources with which to protect themselves from roving bandits in the
facility. Inmates at Andersonville, for example, lived in tents in an open field. Inmates
in typical prisons in the United States lack the materials and authority to construct
secure buildings to protect their property and lives. Third, exit from prison is impos-
sible. As Storr (2006) argues, freedom of exit is an important mechanism for check-
ing the power of potential predators in a community (see, for example, Nozick
1974), and the inability to exit makes violence more likely than in an ideal situation
of anarchy. Fourth, the Andersonville prison was necessarily temporary in nature: the
imprisoned soldiers expected to be released at the war’s conclusion. They believed
that the Union would participate in a prisoner-exchange program and free them from
Andersonville very soon (Marvel 1994, 92, 157). Their short time horizon discour-
aged capital accumulation and reduced the potential gains from repeated dealings.
Most prisons prevent inmates from investing resources productively and thereby
prohibit an important method of keeping order in anarchy.5 Thus, prisons represent
a particularly difficult situation for self-governing mechanisms, relative to an ideal
state of anarchy, where production and exchange are possible, exit may occur, and
group selection processes can sort members.6
3. For a recent survey of public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy, see Powell and Stringham
2009.
4. Storr’s (2006) critique also argues that Hogarty equates anarchy with chaos.
5. Hogarty’s analysis seeks to identify the endogenous formation of a dominant group, but in Anderson-
ville the prison guards actively intervened by supplying the Regulators with clubs to attack the Raiders
(Hogarty 2006, 107). For a better analysis of Hogarty’s hypothesis, the environment under study must
exclude exogenous interference.
6. One aspect of prison makes order easier to achieve: prison guards may effectively protect the inmates
from external threats.
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In this article, I examine successful self-governance in a Bolivian prison, which,
because the facility differs from the typical prison, provides insights into the mecha-
nisms that facilitate order. Inmates effectively govern themselves because of two
institutional features of this unique prison that move it closer to a situation of
anarchy than most prisons. First, inmates are allowed to engage in economic ex-
change within the prison—for example, by opening restaurants, offering carpentry
services, and operating commissaries. In addition, prison guards allow nonprisoners
to enter the facility, so economic exchange with people outside the prison walls
creates a greater division of labor and improved economic opportunities. The free-
dom to exchange raises the cost of engaging in conflict and provides resources to
protect an inmate’s person and property.
Second, secure property rights and well-established markets (including for
inmate-owned cells) exist in the prison. These markets, which inmates expect to
persist into the future, provide incentives to invest resources in productive ways.
Because the inmates are the residual claimants, owners of prison real estate have
incentives to create and enforce rules to protect their property’s value. These rules
include homeowners’ associations and committees to adjudicate disputes and resolve
conflict. The primary factors that facilitate establishment of a self-governing commu-
nity are an increasing division of labor, economic exchange, residual claimants with
secure property rights, and well-established markets that people expect to persist.
I find in this case that even under the unfavorable conditions that a prison presents,
such as a biased agent type and immobility, self-governing communities can accom-
plish order.
Obtaining accurate information about the activities in an inmate-governed for-
eign prison presents a challenge because no official documents report on the facility.
Three types of firsthand accounts of San Pedro Prison, from diverse perspectives,
provide evidence. First, an inmate incarcerated for almost five years for smuggling
cocaine recounts in detail his experience in San Pedro Prison (Young and McFadden
2003). He explains the prison’s organization, the inmate economy, formal rules
created by the inmates, and the social norms.7 Second, official reports prepared by
governments and nongovernmental organizations—including reports by the U.S.
Department of State, the National Lawyers Guild, and the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights—provide evidence.
Finally, a unique source of evidence consists of the reports of nonincarcerated
people who have taken inmate-led tours of the prison. Prison administrators do not
officially approve of these tours, but for a small bribe to the guards, tourists can enter
the prison. According to one journalist, the tour costs $35 and lasts about two hours,
and the inmates give tours to approximately fifty people a day (Baker 2009). For an
7. Personal accounts from prisoners provide important insights that are difficult to obtain from other
sources. For example, Marek Kaminski’s (2004) important work identifies and models the informal norms
in a Polish prison based on his own experience as a political prisoner.
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extra fee, tourists can stay in the prison overnight (Young and McFadden 2003).
Lonely Planet’s guide to Bolivia describes the prison tour as one of the “world’s most
bizarre visitor attractions” (Swaney 2001, 159). Short tours by international visitors
cannot shed light on many aspects of the prison, such as the system of social norms
among inmates, but reports from these visitors confirm many aspects of prison life
documented in alternative sources. In addition, the tours’ very existence testifies to
the social coordination within San Pedro Prison. Given the obscurity of the environ-
ment of study, judging the reliability of any particular personal account is difficult, so
whenever possible I use these multiple sources to corroborate facts.
San Pedro Prison: Self-Governance behind Bars
San Pedro Prison sits in downtown La Paz, Bolivia. Like correctional facilities in the
United States, it has tall, concrete walls around it and guards who stand ominously at
its gates. However, unlike prison officials in the United States, those at San Pedro do
little more than prevent inmates from escaping—no guards maintain order inside the
prison. The guards’ primary job is to keep the inmates inside the prison and to call
the roll once a day (Romei 2003; Young and McFadden 2003, 141). Inmates do not
wear uniforms; bars do not block the cell doors and windows (Estefania 2009).
According to a report by the National Lawyers Guild, “the prison administration
provides no rehabilitation services, no schools, and minimal health care” (Baltimore
et al. 2007, 24). In fact, inmates must pay for any medical services they receive, and
the inmates themselves provide these services (Young and McFadden 2003, 58–61).
About food services, the guild reports, “Although the prison provides a gruel-like
soup and bread twice a day (and meat twice a week), prisoners report that it tastes
bad and causes ulcers and hepatitis. Therefore all those who can afford it purchase or
cook their own food. The kitchen itself was filthy, and the prisoners working in the
kitchen were there as a three month form of unpaid punishment, so they had no
incentive to do their job well” (Baltimore et al. 2007, 24). A delegation from the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concurs that the “food is not proper-
ly prepared, which might lead in many cases to epidemics and gastrointestinal infec-
tions, and that food is also insufficient, obliging many prisoners to pay for their own
food, if they have the money to do so” (Organization of American States 2007, 54).8
Designed to hold 250 inmates, San Pedro Prison now houses from 1,300 to
1,500 (Ceaser 1998; Organization of American States 2007, 49; Estefania 2009).9 In
addition, many inmates’ wives and children also reside in the prison. Prison officials
do not assign cells to inmates, who must purchase their own living quarters from
8. Andersonville prison guards similarly provided small rations of poor-quality food to inmates (Marvel
1994). As at San Pedro, the rations were often insufficient to meet the inmates’ nutritional needs.
9. Officials likewise crowded into Andersonville more than four times the number of prisoners for which
the camp was designed.
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other inmates. The members of this prison community must provide for themselves
without assistance from their jailers.
Inside the prison, officials do not protect property rights, enforce contracts, or
do anything to prevent the rise of a dominant group. The guards are “cowed, out-
numbered, or corrupt enough that their goal is merely to keep the inmates in, and
leave maintaining the prison to [the prisoners]” (Gassaway 2004, XX).10 The inmates
are unconstrained by bars or armed guards, and they “have complete freedom of
movement within the prison” (Baltimore et al. 2007, 23). The police do not enter
the facility, but instead focus on maintaining external security and inspecting visitors
(Organization of American States 2007; Estefania 2009). The National Lawyers
Guild concludes that San Pedro Prison is “essentially self-governed” (Baltimore
et al. 2007, 23).
Inmates must mediate all conflicts that arise inside the prison. The primary
means by which they do so is through democratically elected representatives from
the eight different housing sections inside the prison (Estefania 2009). Housing
sections have developed disciplinary committees to adjudicate disputes and punish
misconduct (Romei 2003). For example, in one case of theft committed inside the
prison the disciplinary committee beat the “convicted” inmate with sticks (Romei
2003). Rusty Young (2009), a writer who lived in the prison for four months,
explains that inmates commonly use the section representatives to mediate conflict,
which he says is one of the representatives’ primary jobs.
Section representatives also have the power to send inmates to isolation cells
(Young and McFadden 2003, 279). These cells resemble those in a more traditional
prison: official prison guards (not prisoners) oversee the small cells, control prisoner
movements, and provide meals. Prisoners in these isolation cells have no access to
shops or restaurants, as the other prisoners do (Young and McFadden 2003, 293–
306).11 If the inmate continues to misbehave after returning to the prison communi-
ty, the section representatives may request his transfer to the maximum-security
Chonchocorro Prison. The threat of banishment to this more restrictive and danger-
ous prison gives section representatives additional power to motivate good behavior
on the part of potentially violent inmates.12
Representatives of each housing section manage their communities much as a
neighborhood association does—adjudicating disputes, providing “club” goods, and
10. Reports from former inmates and from the U.S. Department of State also indicate that guards will
allow inmates out of the prison for a price. “Ability to pay can determine . . . day-pass eligibility . . . even
length of confinement” (U.S. Department of State 2000; See also Young and McFadden 2003, 141–49).
11. Prison officials can affect life inside the prison, for example, by transferring inmates to different prisons
or by raiding the facility in search of weapons. In one instance, news reports about cocaine distribution
inside the prison allegedly motivated prison officials to send an inmate into these isolation cells (Young and
McFadden 2003, 283, 293).
12. No evidence exists to explain the prisoners’ choice between external enforcement (the incarceration
cells) and internal enforcement (inmate-led assaults). The choice made may depend on the perpetrator. In
the past, the prisoners have used external enforcement for violent criminals and more serious offenses.
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organizing community activities. Inmates campaign for positions in each housing
section, including positions as representative, treasurer, discipline secretary, culture
and education secretary, sports secretary, and health secretary. To be eligible for an
elected position, an inmate must have lived in the prison for more than six months,
have an unmortgaged cell, and have no outstanding debt (Young and McFadden
2003, 279).13
In Andersonville, the Raiders often attacked newly arriving inmates because
the new prisoners were not prepared to defend themselves. To protect newcomers
in San Pedro Prison, the inmates’ Reception Committee greets them when they
enter. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights explains that the Recep-
tion Committee, consisting of volunteer inmates, protects the “newcomer from
abuse by other prisoners, and advise[s] him of the rules he must respect within the
prison, and the rights he will enjoy. The committee works with the newcomer to
find him lodging” (Organization of American States 2007, 53, citing the “General
Direction of Prisons”). Inside the prison, the Catholic Church welcomes some
newly arriving inmates with a cell, and Bolivian churches and charities provide
money, clothes, antibiotics, and food to some prisoners (see, for example, Young
and McFadden 2003, 60).
Although these housing section representatives and committees reduce con-
flict in the prison, inmates do act violently against one particular group, sexual
offenders, whom they punish brutally (Burnett 2003; Young and McFadden 2003,
176–81). An inmate explains that when a sexual offender arrives, the other
inmates throw him into a pit, assault him, and sometimes kill him (Young and
McFadden 2003, 176–81). The U.S. Department of State also reports for the year
2005, “Several deaths due to violence in prisons occurred during the year, includ-
ing the death of a child molester/rapist who was killed by his fellow inmates”
(2006).
Violence obviously occurs in the prison. For example, in 1997 an inmate raped
and murdered a girl during a New Year’s Eve celebration (Ceaser 1998; Young and
McFadden 2003, 328). During the daytime, violence is relatively contained, but at
night inmates sometimes “steal from each other and fight with knives” (Estefania
2009). At one point, official prison estimates indicated that “about four deaths a
month [occurred] from both natural causes and ‘accidents’” (Estefania 2009).
According to Young, the most common motivation for stabbings is drug addicts’
failure to pay debts to prison drug dealers. However, “on the whole, [the prison is]
fairly ordered” (2009).
13. Although the evidentiary sources provide no explanation for these rules, it is likely that effective
governance in these roles requires knowledge of the prison. Having been incarcerated for at least six
months provides assurance to inmates that the representative has the requisite abilities. Having no debt
or mortgage on one’s cell may indicate the individual’s interest is sufficiently encompassing to provide him
with an incentive to make good decisions while in office. These requirements might also signal that the
individual has disciplined financial habits and is not addicted to base cocaine (as many prisoners are).
SELF-GOVERNANCE IN SAN PEDRO PRISON F 575
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 4, SPRING 2010
Some inmates exert an influence on the prison economy. “There weren’t any
standover men demanding protection money from you,” explains a former inmate,
“but there were certain powerful people who you knew you had to look after”
(Young and McFadden 2003, 229). Violent inmates reside in the prison, but they
apparently compete more often in the marketplace rather than with violence. For
example, one tour guide explains that the people who “controlled the economy of
the prison liked to run everything themselves, so they tried to set up rival tour
operations in order to run me out of business” (Young and McFadden 203, 217).
Thus, rather than extorting or killing the tour guide, the inmates offered competing
services in the prison economy.
Violence against tourists rarely occurs. The most popular tour guide claims that
on only one occasion did a tourist have his pocket picked. On that occasion, the tour
guide located the thief, physically assaulted him, and returned the wallet to the
rightful owner (Young and McFadden 2003, 273). Estimates of fifty tourists per
day visiting the prison suggest that the facility is fairly safe (Baker 2009).
The central feature of Hogarty’s hypothesis is that subordinate groups in a self-
governed prison will be subject to violence from a dominant group composed of the
most criminal individuals. At San Pedro, however, no dominant group attacks weaker
groups. When violence occurs, it often involves the prison community at large (rather
than only the worst inmates) and serves to protect the community from sexual
offenders. Prisoners use violence to increase the prison’s safety, especially for the
women and children who live there, rather than to benefit a dominant group.
Violence of this nature is more akin to providing a service to the community than to
providing private redistributive benefits to a dominant group.
One potential exception to these peaceful relations is that inmates reportedly
dislike and attack people from the United States. The only evidence of such action,
however, is a story about how inmates mistook an English prisoner for an American
and attacked him on several occasions (Young and McFadden 2003, 85, 89–91).
Many Bolivian prisoners reportedly dislike the United States because they blame its
drug policy for their incarceration (Young and McFadden 2003, 104). However,
Young (2009) saw no Americans among the prisoners during his time in San Pedro,
so it is not possible to examine the welfare of this group in light of this claim. That
American visitors tour the prison in safety casts doubt on the claim.
In Bolivian prisons, inmates’ families may live with them. According to Article 26
of Bolivia’s Law on the Execution of Criminal Sentences, the government allows
children under the age of six to live with incarcerated parents, but prison officials have
not prevented older children and wives from living with incarcerated relatives as well
(Llana 2007; Organization of American States 2007, 55). According to penitentiary
system director Jose´ Orias, “It’s a custom that was permitted and no authority wanted
to put a stop to it. The previous administrations wanted to ingratiate themselves to
the prisoners rather than enforce the law” (Ceaser 1998). As a result, whole families
live behind bars, with the inmates’ children and spouses free to enter and exit as they
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wish, subject to a small fee to the guards (Gassaway 2004; Baker 2009). Commenting
on this familial incarceration, a journalist explains that “the arrangement provides a
type of social security that the inmates’ immediate families don’t get from either their
extended families or the state. Without the father working, women must find jobs,
not act as caretakers. In other cases, mothers themselves are in jail or have abandoned
the family altogether. When whole families move in it’s often for moral support, to
keep the family together, and because, in many instances, they have nowhere else to
go” (Llana 2007). For some families, the prison provides a better living environment
than their own community outside the walls does.
Estimates of the total number of children behind bars in the country range from
654 to 1,624, depending on the year (U.S. Department of State 2000, 2002, 2003).
Recent estimates indicate that 211 children reside in San Pedro Prison: “there are
118 boys and 93 girls living with their fathers. Of these, 107 children are younger
than 6, 74 children are between the ages of 7 and 12, and 30 children are older than
12” (McFarren and Poslu 2009, 1). Social workers report that the number of chil-
dren rises to approximately 400 around Christmas because “during vacation, they all
come to visit an uncle or a brother” (Ceaser 1998).
One eight-year-old who had lived in the prison for a year stated that she had no
problems and explained, “I like it here . . . I have friends, there are lots of fruits
and my dad’s here.” The prison, however, is certainly not an ideal environment for
children. One ten-year-old commented: “There are thieves, rapists, murderers. . . .
In the mornings they’re high on drugs, at night sometimes they steal and the young
men fight.” But, he said, they also “have everything here, free lunches, free bread. . . .
We play soccer, jump into the pool” (Ceaser 1998.)14
The prison has an inmate-run parents’ association. The group’s president says that
the parents ensure the safety of the prison for their children (Llana 2007). He admits
that some inmates abuse drugs and curse, but he says they are the minority. The prison
parent’s association holds inmates accountable for their behavior toward children: “If
anything happens [to the children], we call a meeting, and [the prisoner responsible is]
immediately punished. . . . It is more secure in here than out there” (Llana 2007).
The inmates follow one particular rule closely: no fighting in the presence of
children. When conflict occurs among inmates and a child is nearby, the inmates
must immediately stop fighting. According to a former inmate, prisoners follow this
rule closely (Young and McFadden 2003, 90–91, 333). Young says, “That’s one of
the most important rules. I saw it happen myself. Mid-fight, they stopped, held their
positions when a child went past, then continued belting each other when the child
had passed” (2009).
14. Rather than becoming more prone to criminal behavior, this child explains that growing up in prison
encourages him not to break the law: “Entering jail means losing years. . . . Being shut in is bad” (Ceaser
1998). A priest who works in the prison supports the policy of allowing families to enter the facility
because the “[t]he worst family is always better than the best institution.” In fact, he argues, “[t]he kids
here humanize the prison” (Llana 2007).
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As noted, violence and crime clearly occur inside San Pedro Prison. Inmates
assault and sometimes kill sexual offenders and other inmates; some prisoners steal
from and attack each other. However, the limited evidence available suggests
no dominant group systematically attacks subordinate groups for its own benefit.
Rather than preying on the weakest groups, as the Raiders did in Andersonville,
San Pedro’s prisoners have established rules that protect the weakest groups, includ-
ing new prisoners, women, and children. That women and children choose to reside
in the prison suggests that, for them, it provides a better home than is available
outside the prison.
The Prison Economy
Because women and children are free to enter and exit the prison, they facilitate
economic exchange between inmates and people outside the prison. Women also
bring substantial amounts of resources into San Pedro. The ability to exchange with
people both inside and outside the prison provides inmates with an opportunity to
engage in productive activity.
In Andersonville, “very few prisoners were able to engage in normal labor
activity profitably . . . [and] the volume of [business] depended, inter alia, on the
proprietor’s ability to discourage the presence of raiders in their midst” (Hogarty
[1972] 2006, 107, emphasis in original). Economic exchange necessitated protec-
tion from the dominant group. In San Pedro, despite the lack of government protec-
tion, the inmate-established order protects property rights well enough to facilitate a
vibrant economy.
One inmate explains that inside San Pedro Prison, “everything [is] about mon-
ey. And I mean everything” (Young and McFadden 2003, 81, emphasis in original).
The prison, “apart from being a social microcosm, is also a microeconomy that
operates under basic capitalist principles. In fact, it’s probably more efficient than
the whole Bolivian national economy” (107). Inmates cannot rely on prison officials
“for anything, not even to maintain the buildings, so everything that need[s] to be
done or bought [is] done or bought by the prisoners themselves. And because of
this, anyone who [isn’t] independently wealthy [has] to have a job” (134).
Because inmates must pay for their cells and the prison food is unsanitary,
inmates find ways to earn incomes to provide for their needs. Many own small grocery
stores, restaurants, barbershops, butcher shops, and copying centers (Baltimore et al.
2007, 23; Baker 2009; Estefania 2009). Some inmates offer carpentry services to
those who want to improve their living arrangements. The owner of a food stall
explains: “Not everyone likes the food in the canteen, so we sell snacks and
sandwiches here for inmates and for their families when they come to visit. . . . The
chorizo sandwich with tomato and salad costs three bolivianos [about forty-three
cents]. With the money I make, I pay my rent and keep a few bolivianos for cigarettes”
(Estefania 2009).
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Many inmates manage profitable businesses in the prison, especially those who
had experience in a trade before their incarceration. According to one inmate, during
the time he was at San Pedro the prison’s economy included
cooks, painters, restaurateurs, carpenters, electricians, cleaners, accoun-
tants and doctors. There were artesanos who sold their artwork and tiny
handicrafts—such as paintings and figurines—to visitors. There was even a
lawyer in for fraud, who, although he obviously couldn’t accompany them
to court, offered cheap legal advice to inmates. Basically, anything you
wanted done or anything you wanted to buy, you could, and if they didn’t
have it, someone could get it in for you for a small commission. But in
fact, many of the services were actually cheaper than on the outside, so
sometimes bargain hunters came into the prison to visit imprisoned bar-
bers and dentists who offered cut-price deals to attract trade. (Young and
McFadden 2003, 134)
Inmates who lack skills in a trade earn incomes by performing simple tasks, such as
shining shoes and relaying messages to inmates when they have a visitor at the prison
gate. Some inmates manufacture narcotics inside the prison, and guards, women,
and children smuggle the cocaine out of the prison (Young and McFadden 2003,
74, 237–39).15
Compared to Andersonville prisoners, the inmates at San Pedro have more oppor-
tunities to engage in productive activity, which reduces their engagement in violence
and conflict. Economic exchange creates wealth, which inmates can use to protect
their property and lives. The flourishing of markets inside the prison evinces the extent
to which the self-ordering prisoners successfully enforce their property rights.
Property Rights and Established Markets
Andersonville prisoners constantly discussed the possibility of the prison’s releasing
them in exchange for captured Confederate soldiers (Marvel 1994, 92, 157). In
contrast, inmates in San Pedro Prison have access to well-established markets inside
the prison and an expectation that both these markets and the prison will persist. This
permanency creates several beneficial incentives for inmates. First, the length of a civil
prison sentence is more certain than the period a prisoner of war will be detained, so
San Pedro’s inmates can make a better estimate of the costs and benefits of investing
in capital goods.16 Second, Andersonville prisoners assumed that the authorities
would close the camp at the war’s conclusion, which would eliminate the value of
15. The opportunity to consume high-quality drugs is apparently one reason for some tourists’ interest in
visiting the facility (Ceaser 1998; Young and McFadden 2003, 220).
16. Seventy-five percent of the inmates in San Pedro are awaiting trial (Estefania 2009).
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prison-based investments, but San Pedro has well-developed real estate markets for
selling housing to the continual flow of incoming inmates. An inmate who purchases
a cell can sell it as his departure from the prison approaches. Prisoners invest more in
productive activities because they have a reasonable expectation of profiting when
their incarceration concludes; these investments secure their property and lives and
increase their safety inside the prison.
Housing serves an important purpose for inmates—protection. Secure, locked
cells give inmates a place to leave valuables and to enjoy personal safety. The National
Lawyers Guild reports that inside San Pedro, the “living units are unlike cells in that
there are no bars. If there are locks on the doors, the keys are kept by the prisoner
who can lock his unit at any time” (Baltimore et al. 2007, 24). In Andersonville,
prisoners had to rely on burying valuable goods inside or near their tents to protect
them from theft. In San Pedro Prison, inmates have long time horizons and a secure
property right to their residences, so they invest in more and better housing facilities,
which increase their safety in the prison.
The San Pedro Prison requires inmates to purchase their cells, and inmates, to
avoid sleeping in the prison’s corridors and courtyards, rent or buy their own hous-
ing from other inmates (Baltimore et al. 2007; Organization of American States
2007, 52). These accommodations vary a great deal, from bare six-by-nine-foot
rooms to relatively luxurious multistory apartments (Ceaser 1998; Estefania 2009).
Some inmates occupy small cells “with no ventilation, lighting, or beds. Crowding in
some ‘low-rent’ sections obliges inmates to sleep sitting up” (U.S. Department of
State 2001). However, as one inmate reports, “If you have money you can live like a
king” (Estefania 2009). One wealthy inmate constructed a second floor to his cell
and purchased a piano (Young and McFadden 2003, 134, 231; Gassaway 2004).
Many prisoners have televisions, stoves, refrigerators, microwaves, and other modern
conveniences (Baltimore et al. 2007, 24).
Cells at San Pedro exist in eight different housing sections named Posta, Pinos,
Alamos, San Martin, Prefectura, Palmar, Guanay, and Cancha (Young and McFadden
2003, 80; Estefania 2009). The Posta, Pinos, and Alamos sections operate like gated
communities, and each housing section has a rating that indicates its quality (Young
and McFadden 2003, 92). During the day, inmates can freely move about all sections
except the nicest one, but at night representatives of the nicer sections lock out
nonresidents, usually at 9:00 P.M. (Young and McFadden 2003, 94; Baltimore et al.
2007, 24). The lower-quality housing sections do not have gates to keep nonresi-
dents out at night, and they are dirty and house many of the drug-addicted inmates
(Young and McFadden 2003, 96). These sections, according to one inmate, are
“where all the stabbings occur . . . [but] it’s perfectly safe during the day. At night is
when you have to look out” (Young and McFadden 2003, 96).
In a report on Bolivians’ legal rights, the National Lawyers Guild explains that
in San Pedro, “[e]ach section has the feel of a neighborhood or even a small village
with its own courtyard plaza and shops. The committee in charge of each section
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manages the section, repairing the sidewalks or painting the walls. Each ‘directiva’ sets
an assessment charge for prisoners in the section and each committee is responsible for
its own budget. Inmates pay for all services” (Baltimore et al. 2007, 23). Part of a
cell’s purchase price pays for access to that particular section’s amenities, and some
sections have billiard tables and kiosks selling fresh juice and different types of food.
Many sections even sponsor intersectional soccer tournaments (Baltimore et al. 2007,
24; Estefania 2009). Inmates enjoy gambling on matches between the sections’ soccer
teams, so the section leaders sometimes buy nice cells in their sections for the most
skilled players (Gassaway 2004). The Coca-Cola Company sponsors teams inside the
prison and provides tables, chairs, and umbrellas in exchange for a monopoly of the
prison’s soft drink business (Young and McFadden 2003, 233; Gassaway 2004).
Housing prices vary between $20 and $5,000, depending on the quality (U.S.
Department of State 2001; Baltimore et al. 2007, 23). Inmates purchase cells for the
duration of their sentences, but owners may put their housing units on the real-estate
market at any time. Owners often place a “for sale” sign or hire an intermediary to
sell the unit to an incoming or current inmate (Baltimore et al. 2007, 23). Inmates
usually buy cells either from the prison’s major upon entry into the facility or from
freelance real-estate agents. When new inmates arrive, the major provides a listing of
currently available cells and acts as intermediary to sell a housing unit to the new
arrival (Young and McFadden 2003, 54). According to inmates, however, the major
charges about 50 percent more than when inmates buy cells on their own (Young
and McFadden 2003, 80). The freelance real-estate agents work on commission, and
they often place advertisements in prison restaurants and on bulletin boards in each
section (Young and McFadden 2003, 81).
Each housing section charges a nonrefundable fee, usually 20 percent or
25 percent, when an inmate purchases a cell (Young and McFadden 2003, 82). These
funds “cover section expenses such as maintenance, administration, cleaning, renova-
tions and the occasional social event such as the Prisoners’ Day party every September,
when the section delegates [cook] a barbecue and [hire] a band for the inmates”
(Young and McFadden 2003, 81). Sections rarely refuse an inmate as long as he has
paid the entrance fee and a cell is available (81). However, the more expensive sections
sometimes require that a current resident recommend an applicant. In some parts of
the prison, section representatives can expel residents for smoking base cocaine (94).
Inmate real-estate owners use the housing-section representatives to protect
their property from squatters. Each cell owner holds a title to the property that
contains such information as the room number, location, a brief description, the
name of the previous owner, and the sale price (Young and McFadden 2003, 82).
The owner holds the original title, and many inmates make copies and deposit them
with their section register. When inmates agree on an acceptable price, they sign a
sale-purchase contract in front of the section delegate, who verifies the transaction
and stamps the contract with the section’s official seal. A witness also signs the
contract to certify the exchange.
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An inmate who cannot afford to buy a cell can rent space in someone else’s cell
or from an inmate who owns multiple cells. An inmate explains: “I can’t afford
to buy [a cell], so I rent it for 80 bolivianos ($10; £6) a month. I am awaiting trial.
I could be here another three months or two years—nobody knows. I am accused of
drug trafficking. I have this cell to myself—it has a kitchenette and a tiny window to
see the sun, so I guess it’s not that bad” (Estefania 2009). Some housing sections will
allow a poor prisoner to stay in a small room if he works for the section—for
example, cleaning the bathrooms (Young and McFadden 2003, 83).
Inmates have secure property rights to their housing in the prison and access
to markets, so they have an incentive to devise mechanisms for protecting their
property. Democratically elected representatives coordinate the provision of club
goods and safety within their community. Current residents have an incentive to
maintain security in their sections and to improve their property to increase its
market value. Residents in the poorer sections of the prison are less capable of
protecting themselves; however, even a cell with a locking door provides some safety.
Inmates at San Pedro know that a functioning real-estate market exists and will
persist, so they invest in housing, which protects both themselves and their property.
Conclusion
San Pedro Prison in La Paz, Bolivia, provides an opportunity to examine the
operation of self-governance in a unique environment and to identify how robust
self-enforcing mechanisms are for biased agents. In contrast to the situation at
Andersonville prison camp in George during the U.S. Civil War, no group of indivi-
duals dominates San Pedro Prison, and the factors that allow this relatively orderly
existence are those that approximate anarchy more closely. Because inmates may
engage in economic exchange, have access to established markets in real estate, and
hold their property rights with security from external appropriation, they have the
necessary means to establish order and to engage in productive activities. Property
rights in San Pedro are secure enough to allow extensive economic exchange, includ-
ing in housing markets, and the prison is safe enough that many women and children
choose to live there.
Violence still occurs in San Pedro, though, and many prisoners are poor and
addicted to drugs. The National Lawyers Guild reports:
Make no mistake, however, the prison was as poor as most of the rest of
Bolivia. With the lack of medical care and adequate nutrition (unless a
prisoner had the means to purchase it), the absence of meaningful educa-
tion or occupational programs and the anxiety from not knowing how long
a prisoner might be confined, the punishment of the deprivation of liberty
in Bolivia is still very severe. However, because family ties can be maintained
and because the prisoner can actually earn money inside to help support
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himself with even a little for the family outside, prison life just seemed much
more approximated to life on the outside. (Baltimore et al. 2007)
Despite the hardships of living in this Bolivian prison, the violence that came to
epitomize Andersonville prison camp does not characterize San Pedro Prison.
The San Pedro Prison case study provides an example of self-governance in prison
that results in order because alternative institutional features mitigate violence. The
violence associated with a Hobbesian jungle ignores the fact that self-interested people
often have incentives to develop mechanisms to reduce conflict. These mechanisms
emerge more easily when the return to productive activity improves. Specialization and
the division of labor expand with the extent of the market, reducing the need to resort
to violence. The arrangements in San Pedro Prison suggest that self-ordering commu-
nities in a prison can establish property rights, vibrant markets, and safety, thereby
avoiding the predation highlighted in past research on self-governed prisons.
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